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The Right to Marry 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court has said that there is a constitutional “right to marry”; but 
what can this possibly mean? People do not have a right to marry their dog, their aunt, 
June 29, a rose petal, their neighbors, or a sunny day. This essay attempts to make some 
progress in understanding both the content and the scope of the right to marry. With 
respect to content, it concludes that people have no more and no less than this: a right of 
access to whatever expressive and material benefits the state now provides for the 
institution of marriage. It follows that the right to marry falls within the “fundamental” 
rights branch of equal protection doctrine, and is not properly understood in terms of 
substantive due process; it also follows that the state could abolish the official institution 
of marriage tomorrow. With respect to scope, the essay identifies a minimal 
understanding, to the effect that the right to marry is enjoyed by any couple consisting of 
one adult man and one adult woman. The minimal understanding can claim a plausible 
defense in a tradition-based understanding of fundamental rights; and on institutional 
grounds, a tradition-based understanding has a great deal of appeal. Its problem is that 
it has a degree of arbitrariness. This is a formidable problem, but for reasons of 
prudence, federal courts should not adopt a broader understanding that would, for 
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example, require same-sex marriages to be recognized. The essay concludes with some 
remarks on the possible abolition of the official institution of marriage. It explains that 
there are plausible grounds for objecting to that institution and that there is a real 
question whether the current system would be chosen if a society were starting from 
scratch. It emphasizes that marriage is emphatically an government-run licensing system, 
embodying a set of governmental mandates and conditions. An understanding of this 
point should inform constitutional discussion, which ought not to proceed by identifying 
religious and official marriage, or by pretending that the official institution is in some 
sense natural and foreordained. 
 
 
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . Marriage is one of the basic civil 
rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. 
 Loving v. Virginia1 
 
 
Modern marriage has lost its meaning—consequently one abolishes it. 
 Friedrich Nietzsche2 
 
 
Why should the state privilege some adult dyads but not others? Why should the state 
privilege only dyads? Why not triads? In other words, what business does the state have in 
deciding which adult personal relationships are deserving of legal protection and benefits and 
which are not?  Patricia Cain3 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 381 US 479 (1965). 
2 Frederich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche 544 (Walter Kaufmann trans. & 
ed., 1954) 
3 Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 27 (1996) 
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Is there a constitutional right to marry? On several occasions, the Supreme Court 
has said so.4 But the very idea of a “right to marry” presents two sets of puzzles. The first 
involves the content of the right—what it provides for those who are entitled to it. The 
second set of puzzles involves the scope of the right to marry—the kinds of relationships 
that can claim it.  
Begin with the first puzzle. As an official matter, marriage is no more and no less 
than a government-run licensing system. Why should governments license marriages? 
Some people are skeptical of the official institution of marriage and argue that it should 
be abolished—not by forbidding private arrangements, religious or otherwise, but by 
eliminating the special status that governments confer, including a unique set of legal 
benefits and burdens.5 Doubts about this particular licensing system have cast in sharp 
relief the wide range of possibilities, with respect to human relationships, that the simple 
notions of “married” and “single” tend to erase.6 But are states under a constitutional 
obligation to recognize an official institution called “marriage”? Does the due process 
clause really mean that governments must provide tax, social security, and other benefits 
to those who are lawfully married? Or does it mean, much more modestly, that states may 
not forbid religious and other organizations from performing “marriage ceremonies” and 
allowing those who go through such ceremonies to claim that status as a matter of 
personal choice?  
And what relationships are included within the right to marry? People do not have 
a right to marry their dog, their house, their refrigerator, July 21, or a rose petal. At most, 
people have a right to marry people. But the Supreme Court cannot possibly have meant 
to suggest that “people” have a general right to marry “people”; it did not mean to say 
that under the due process clause, any “person” has a right to marry a dozen other people, 
or five, or even two. We might conclude that the Court is saying at most that one person 
has a right to marry one other person. But if there is a right to marry, what is the basis for 
this particular limitation on the right?  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
5 See Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (2004); Patricia Cain, Imagine 
There’s No Marriage, 16 Quinnipiac L Rev 27 (1996); Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues, 30 Ariz L Rev 
207 (1988). 
6 See id.; Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 Mich L. Rev. 129 (2003); Elizabeth 
F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOCIAL CHANGE (forthcoming 2004). 
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The major goal of this Essay is to make some progress in understanding the 
content and scope of the right to marry. My initial suggestion is that the right to marry is 
best understood as an analogue to the right to vote. In both cases, states are under no 
obligation to create the relevant institutions; but once those institutions are created, the 
Constitution imposes large barriers to government efforts to deny people access to them. 
This point suggests that the right to marry should be taken as part of the “fundamental 
rights” branch of equal protection, not as part of substantive due process at all. But what 
is the institution of marriage? It has two characteristics: the expressive legitimacy that 
comes from the public institution of marriage; and the panoply of material benefits, both 
economic and noneconomic, that the marital relationship confers.7 The right to marry, 
                                                 
7 For a highly illuminating summary of one state’s law, see Goodridge: “With no attempt to be 
comprehensive, we note that some of the statutory benefits conferred by the Legislature on those who enter 
into civil marriage include, as to property: joint Massachusetts income tax filing (G. L. c. 62C, § 6); 
tenancy by the entirety (a form of ownership that provides certain protections against creditors and allows 
for the automatic descent of property to the surviving spouse without probate) (G. L. c. 184, § 7); extension 
of the benefit of the homestead protection (securing up to $ 300,000 in equity from creditors) to one's 
spouse and children (G. L. c. 188, § 1); automatic rights to inherit the property of a deceased spouse who 
does not leave a will (G. L. c. 190, § 1); the rights of elective share and of dower (which allow surviving 
spouses certain property rights where the decedent spouse has not made adequate provision for the survivor 
in a will) (G. L. c. 191, § 15, and G. L. c. 189); entitlement to wages owed to a deceased employee (G. L. c. 
149, § 178A [general] and G. L. c. 149, § 178C [public employees]); eligibility to continue certain 
businesses of a deceased spouse (e.g., G. L. c. 112, § 53 [dentist]); the right to share the medical policy of 
one's spouse (e.g., G. L. c. 175, § 108, Second [a] [3] [**956] [defining an insured's "dependent" to include 
one's spouse), see Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 43, 714 N.E.2d 335 (1999) [domestic partners of city 
employees not included within the term "dependent" as used in G. L. c. 32B, § 2]); thirty-nine week 
continuation of health coverage for the spouse of a person who is laid off or dies (e.g., G. L. c. 175, § 
110G); preferential options under the Commonwealth's pension system (see G. L. c. 32, § 12 [2] ["Joint and 
Last Survivor Allowance"]); preferential benefits in the Commonwealth's medical program, MassHealth 
(e.g., 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012 [A] prohibiting placing a lien on long-term care patient's former 
home if spouse still lives there); access to veterans' spousal benefits and preferences (e.g., G. L. c. 115, § 1 
[defining "dependents"] and G. L. c. 31, § 26 [State employment] and § 28 [municipal employees]); 
financial protections for spouses of certain Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, 
prosecutors, among others) killed in the performance of duty (e.g., G. L. c. 32, §§ 100-103); the equitable 
division of marital property on divorce (G. L. c. 208, § 34); temporary and permanent alimony rights (G. L. 
c. 208, §§ 17 and 34); the right to separate support on separation of the parties that does not result in 
divorce (G. L. c. 209, § 32); and the right to bring claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium, and 
for funeral and burial expenses and punitive damages resulting from tort actions (G. L. c. 229, §§ 1 and 2; 
G. L. c. 228, § 1. See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., supra).  
Exclusive marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights include the presumptions of 
legitimacy and parentage of children born to a married couple (G. L. c. 209C, § 6, and G. L. c. 46, § 4B); 
and evidentiary rights, such as the prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about their 
private conversations, applicable in both civil and criminal cases (G. L. c. 233, § 20). Other statutory 
benefits of a personal nature available only to married individuals include qualification for bereavement or 
medical leave to care for individuals related by blood or marriage (G. L. c. 149, § 52D); an automatic 
"family member" preference to make medical decisions for an incompetent or disabled spouse who does 
not have a contrary health care proxy, see Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456, 466, 709 N.E.2d 58 (1999); the 
application of predictable rules of child custody, visitation, support, and removal out-of-State when married 
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then, is a right of access to the expressive and material benefits that the state affords to 
the institution of marriage. Unless a compelling justification can be found, no one can be 
denied access to those benefits. This understanding of the right to marry suggests that 
states may abolish marriage without offending the Constitution; it also suggests that so 
long as the institution of marriage exists, the relevant right entitles people, not to any 
particular set of expressive and material benefits, but to exactly that panoply of benefits 
that the relevant state offers. In this respect, the dimensions of the right are determined by 
close reference to positive law. 
But what is the scope of that right? At a minimum, the right includes relationships 
between one man and one woman. Hence we can specify the minimal content of the right 
to marry: a right, by one adult man and one adult woman, to enter into the marital 
relationship, with whatever expressive and material incidents the state affords, unless the 
relevant restriction is supported by compelling justifications. This minimal understanding 
is fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions. It can also claim plausible support 
in a tradition-centered approach to constitutional interpretation, one that attempts to root 
an understanding of liberty in longstanding practices. Under the minimal understanding, 
some bans on incestuous marriages are probably unconstitutional; but the bans on 
homosexual, bigamous, and polygamous marriages are legitimate, simply because such 
marriages do not involve one man and one woman. 
The principal problem with the minimal understanding is that it seems to draw 
arbitrary lines. Why should the scope of the right be limited in that way? Compare a 
maximal understanding of the right to marry: a right, by two or more adults, to enter into 
                                                                                                                                                 
parents divorce (e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 19 [temporary custody], § 20 [temporary support], § 28 [custody and 
support on judgment of divorce], § 30 [removal from Commonwealth], and § 31 [shared custody plan]; 
priority rights to administer the estate of a deceased spouse who dies without a will, and requirement that 
surviving spouse must consent to the appointment of any other person as administrator (G. L. c. 38, § 13 
[disposition of body], and G. L. c. 113, § 8 [anatomical gifts]); and the right to interment in the lot or tomb 
owned by one's deceased spouse (G. L. c. 114, §§ 29-33).  
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or indirectly, but no less 
auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil marriage. 
Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions between marital and 
nonmarital children in providing for the support and care of minors, see Department of Revenue v. Mason 
M., 439 Mass. 665, 790 N.E.2d 671 (2003); Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 435 Mass. 536, 
546, 760 N.E.2d 257 (2002), the fact remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability and 
economic security based on their parents' legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as 
readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval 
that still attends the status of being a marital child. Others are material, such as the greater ease of access to 
family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parentage.” 
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the marital relationship, with its expressive and material incidents, unless the relevant 
restriction is supported by compelling justifications. This approach would essentially 
convert marriage from a closed licensing system into an open-ended one, allowing people 
to enter into marital agreements as they see fit. Such an approach might tailor its 
economic incidents to the particulars of the relationship—refusing, for example, to 
accord economic benefits when there is no sufficient reason for them. From the 
constitutional point of view, the problem with the maximal understanding is that it 
depends on a broad and unanchored understanding of “liberty,” one that endangers 
restrictions on marriage that are at least time-honored. The task is to produce a 
conception of the scope of the right that lacks the arbitrariness of the minimal 
understanding and also the extreme breadth of the maximal one.  
I suggest that for courts, the best way to carry out that task is by reference not to 
the due process clause, which is founded on tradition, but the equal protection clause, 
which calls traditions into sharp doubt. The question is whether a state has an adequate 
justification, under the appropriate standard of review, to deny certain people access to 
the expressive and material benefits of marriage. Under existing law, the maximal 
understanding is certainly not compelled by equal protection principles, but the minimal 
understanding runs into serious difficulties, above all in the context of prohibitions on 
same-sex marriages. I contend that in principle, bans on same-sex marriage do run afoul 
of the equal protection clause, but that federal courts should be extremely reluctant to 
reach that conclusion for prudential reasons involving their limited role in the 
constitutional order. At least as a general rule, the issue of same-sex marriage is best 
handled through democratic arenas and at the state level (including through decisions of 
state courts).  
I conclude with some general remarks about the institution of marriage. As many 
people have argued, there are plausible reasons to question whether states should operate 
and license the marital institution. It is not unreasonable to ask whether marriage should 
be deregulated—whether it should be run by religious and other institutions, subject not 
to state licensing law, but to rules of contract and criminal prohibitions. I attempt to spell 
out the grounds for this view, which seems to be both plausible and illuminating. On the 
other hand, the abolition of state-licensed marriage would be a radical step, one that 
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would defeat longstanding expectations and eliminate one means through which people 
affirm their commitments to one another. For this reason, I do not favor it. But an 
appreciation of the arguments in opposition to official marriage helps to cast the right to 
marry in a fresh light, by demonstrating that we are speaking here of a system of 
aggressive government intervention, not of anything that stems from nature. For the 
future, the shape of that system should be seen as chosen rather than dictated. 
Constitutional decisions should be cautious, here as elsewhere, but they should be made 
with an awareness that marriage is a government-operated licensing scheme, one that 
imposes on citizens a host of governmental choices. 
I. Marriage and the Supreme Court 
The constitutional right to marriage has long origins. In 1888, the Court described 
marriage as “the most important relation in life,”8 and said that it was “the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.”9 In Meyer v. Nebraska,10 one of the cases that created substantive due process 
in its current form, the Court said that the due process clause protected the right “to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children.”11 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,12 striking 
down a compulsory sterilization law, the Court described marriage as “fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”13 Griswold v. Connecticut14 held that states 
could not ban married couples from using contraceptives. The Court emphasized that it 
was dealing with “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political 
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”15 
None of these cases, however, involved the right to marry as such. In its modern 
form, the right to marry is principally a product of three cases. The initial decision is 
                                                 
8 Maynard v. Hill, 125 US 190, 205 (1888). 
9 Id. at 211. 
10 262 US 390 (1923). 
11 Id. at 399. 
12 316 US 
13 Id. at 541. 
14 381 US 479 (1965). 
15 Id. at 486. 
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Loving v. Virginia,16 where the Court struck down a ban on interracial marriage. Most of 
the Court’s opinion spoke in terms of the equal protection clause, seeing that ban as a 
form of racial discrimination. The Court could easily have stopped there. But in a 
separate ruling, set off in a puzzlingly independent section, the Court also held that the 
ban violated the due process clause. In the Court’s words, “the freedom to marry has long 
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”17 It added that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”18 What does this mean? 
Apparently the Court believed that procreation, and possibly the successful raising of 
children, are inextricably linked to the institution of marriage. 
But the Loving Court’s due process ruling was not free from ambiguity. After 
emphasizing that freedom to marry is “one of the vital personal rights,” the Court added 
that the due process clause is violated if a government denies “this fundamental freedom 
on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes”; it 
stressed that “freedom of choice to marry” may “not be restricted by invidious racial 
discrimination.”19 Subsequent cases confirm that the right to marry counts as fundamental 
for constitutional purposes—and is sufficient by itself to take the analysis into the domain 
of heightened scrutiny.  
The key decision is Zablocki v. Redhail.20 There the Court invoked the equal 
protection clause to strike down a Wisconsin law forbidding people under child support 
obligations to remarry unless they obtained a judicial determination that they had met 
those obligations and that their children were not likely to become public charges. The 
Court announced that “the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all 
individuals,”21 and added that “the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of 
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family 
relationships.”22 The Court did not give a careful explanation of this conclusion. It noted 
that women have a right to seek an abortion or to give birth to an illegitimate child; it 
                                                 
16 388 U.S. 1 (1968). 
17 Id. at 12. 
18 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
19 Id. at 12. 
20 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
21 Id. at 384. 
22 Id. at 386. 
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claimed that “a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting must 
receive equivalent protection.”23 The Court added that if the “right to procreate means 
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which” the state 
“allows sexual relations legally to take place.”24 The apparent suggestion here is that the 
right to marry has constitutional status because the status of marriage is a legal 
precondition for sexual relations. (In a period in which the Constitution is seen to protect 
sexual relations outside of marriage,25 this suggestion loses its foundation.) 
Notwithstanding its clear association of the right to marry with other rights protected by 
the due process clause, the Court’s ultimate holding turned on the fundamental rights 
branch of equal protection doctrine, not on substantive due process26—a point to which I 
will return. 
The Court did not mean to suggest that because of the existence of the right to 
marry, it would apply strict scrutiny to “every state regulation which relates in any way to 
the incidents of or prerequisite for marriage.”27 The Court said that it would uphold 
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the 
marital relationship.”28 But any “direct and substantial” interference with the right to 
marry would be strictly scrutinized. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens underlined 
the point, urging that the Constitution would cast serious doubt on any “classification 
which determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship.”29 This 
suggestion appears to be extremely broad, applying to incestuous and same-sex marriages 
among others—though it is most doubtful that Justice Stevens meant to suggest that 
states must recognize those marriages. In Zablocki itself, the restriction could not be 
justified, for it was an unnecessarily intrusive means of ensuring compliance with child 
support obligations. In Turner v. Safley,30 the Court followed and extended Zablocki, 
striking down a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying unless there 
                                                 
23 Id. at 386. 
24 Id.  
25 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
26 Justice Stewart objected to rooting the decision in equal protection rather than due process. Id at 
xxyy. 
27 434 US at 386. 
28 434 US at 386-87 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)). 
29 Id. at 404. 
30 482 US 78 (1987). 
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were “compelling reasons” for them to do so. “Compelling reasons” were understood to 
include pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child.31 The Court acknowledged that the 
prison setting is distinctive and usually calls for a measure of judicial deference. But it 
concluded that Zablocki applies in that setting, at least in such a way as to call for 
invalidation of the prison regulation. In fact the Court went beyond its previous decisions 
to spell out some of the foundations of the right to marry. It said that marriages, by 
inmates as by others, ‘are expressions of emotional support and public commitment.”32 It 
emphasized that these are “important and significant aspects of the marital 
relationship.”33 It added that marriages are often recognized as having spiritual 
significance—and that “marital status often is a prerequisite for” a number of material 
benefits, including property rights, government benefits, and less tangible advantages.34 
These conclusions underlay the Court’s conclusion that even in the prison, the right to 
marry must be respected unless the state can produce compelling reasons for interfering 
with it.  
Very oddly, the Turner Court did not specify whether the right to marry was 
rooted in substantive due process (as Loving suggested) or in the fundamental rights 
branch of equal protection doctrine (the most sensible reading of Zablocki). One searches 
the opinion in vain for a clear identification of the constitutional provision that the Court 
was construing. It would be fair to read the Court as treating marriage as akin to other 
privacy rights, in a way that suggests that substantive due process is involved. But for 
purposes of reaching its conclusion, the Court did not have to choose between the two 
possible sources of its decision. 
II. What Is the Right to Marry? Of Positive Rights and Negative Rights 
Suppose that there is a right to marry. What, exactly, does this mean? Imagine 
that a state abolishes the institution of marriage in the following sense: It says that it will 
not recognize anything called “marriage,” nor will it provide marriage licenses in any 
form. It will not legitimate particular relationships through declaring them as 
                                                 
31 Id. at 82.  
32 Id. at 95. 
33 Id. at 96. 
34 Id. at 96. 
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“marriages.” Nor will it confer special economic or other benefits on people who deem 
themselves to be “married.” But it will not forbid such private arrangements as people 
choose. Above all, it will allow private persons to organize their personal relationships as 
they see fit, subject to imaginable limitations stemming from the criminal law (as in the 
ban on sexual relations with children and on incest). Religious ceremonies, constituting 
relationships that the parties may call “marriage,” or whatever they like, would not be 
abolished. If the parties follow the proper formalities for enforceable contracts, their 
agreements would be enforceable under the ordinary terms of contract law. The state 
would provide default rules here as elsewhere. But as a matter of law, and apart from 
these points, there would be no such thing as “marriage” as an official matter of state 
licensing.  
A. May States Abolish (or Radically Alter) Marriage? 
Does the “right to marry” mean that the abolition of marriage would be 
unconstitutional35? Under the Court’s decisions, this would not be an implausible 
conclusion. Perhaps the Court is best read as having recognized the existence, within 
Anglo-American law, of the institution of marriage as one that the government 
recognizes and safeguards. But if there is a right to an official institution of marriage, 
what must the state do or provide? The initial question is what marriage actually entails. 
We need to distinguish here between material benefits on the one hand and expressive 
ones on the other. 
Many material benefits, economic and noneconomic, accompany the marital 
relationship.36 Of course state law varies, but these benefits fall in six major categories.37 
1. Tax benefits (and burdens). While a great deal of public attention is paid to the 
“marriage penalty,” the tax system rewards many couples when they marry—at 
least if one spouse earns a great deal more than the other. Hence there is a 
marriage “bonus” for couples in traditional relationships, in which the man is the 
                                                 
35 See Cain, supra note, for general discussion. 
36 See note supra; Thomas Coleman, The High Cost of Being Single in America, available at 
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/cost-discrimination.htm 
37 I draw here on Bernstein, supra note, and David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of 
Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich L Rev. 447 (1996). 
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breadwinner and the woman stays at home. The marriage penalty can be 
significant if the spouses both earn substantial incomes. Married couples can file 
joint returns. Members of such couples are allowed to transfer property between 
one another within being subject to gain-loss valuation. 
2. Entitlements. Federal law benefits members of married couples through a number 
of entitlement programs. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act,38 for example, 
employers must allow unpaid leave to workers who seek to car for a spouse; they 
need not do so for “partners.” Veterans benefits provide a range of economic 
programs (involving medical care, housing, and educational assistance) to the 
spouses, but not the partners, of veterans. Those who are married to federal 
employees can also claim benefits unavailable to those who are unmarried. Under 
state law, the entitlement to consortium protects spouses; the status of members of 
unmarried couples is unclear.  
3. Inheritance and other death benefits. A member of a married couple obtains a 
number of benefits at the time of death. Default rules favor wives and husbands 
for those who die without a will, and many states forbid people from refusing to 
leave money to the person to whom they are married. Under the Uniform Probate 
Code, those who die intestate give much of their estate to their spouse, even if 
they had children. In wrongful death actions, spouses automatically qualify for 
benefits; the status of those in unmarried couples is far less clear.  
4. Ownership benefits. Under both state and federal law, spouses may have 
automatic ownership rights that nonspouses lack. In community property states, 
people have automatic rights to the holdings of their spouses, and they cannot 
contract around the legal rules. Even in states that do not follow community 
property rules, states may presume joint ownership of property acquired after 
marriage and before legal separation. The idea of tenancy by the entirety may 
establish legal unity to married couples, in a way that also grants ownership 
benefits (and burdens) to those involved.  
5. Surrogate decisionmaking. Members of married couples are given the right o 
make surrogate decisions of various sorts in the event of incapacitation. When an 
                                                 
3829 USC 2601-2654 (2000). 
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emergency arises, a spouse is permitted to make judgments on behalf of an 
incapacitated partner. More generally, a spouse might be appointed formal 
guardian, entitled to make decisions about care, residence, and money, as well as 
about particular medical options.39 
6. Evidentiary privileges. Federal courts, and a number of state courts, recognize 
marital privileges, including a right to keep marital communications confidential 
and to exclude adverse spousal testimony.  
This is a large set of benefits, and there are sharp political constraints on any 
effort to rethink them; but certainly the state is not constitutionally required to provide 
them. Suppose, for example, that the state altered a host of laws to place married people 
closer to, or on the same plane as, or even as below unmarried couples or single people. It 
defies belief to suggest that the alteration would be an unconstitutional violation of the 
“right to marry.” Recall that Zablocki limited its holding to “direct and substantial 
interference” with the right to marry; the Court expressly said that it did not mean to call 
into question laws that affect people’s incentives to marry. The line the Court meant to 
draw is not entirely clear, but at the very least, existing doctrine does not require 
economic benefits to be provided to married people as such. 
But if the right to marry does not require a panoply of economic benefits, what, 
exactly, does it entail? Perhaps it operates as a kind of precondition for certain familial 
rights that continue to be material in a sense but that are, broadly speaking, associational 
in character—the right, for example, to visit and make choices for a loved one in case of 
incapacitating illness. Under existing law, marriage is not literally a precondition for 
these rights; but it usually makes their exercise significantly easier. Is the state 
constitutionally obliged to provide the institution of marriage so as to recognize these 
rights? Suppose that a state abolishes marriages and denies members of committed 
relationships the right to make decisions on behalf of their incapacitated partners in the 
hospital. There is a plausible argument that the due process clause forbids states from 
disallowing such visits.40 Or suppose that the state abolishes marriage and denies people 
in committed relationships the right to adopt children. Serious constitutional questions 
                                                 
39 See Chambers, supra note, at 455. 
40 The argument seems a fortiori after Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), which held that 
there is a constitutional right, on the part of parents, to control visitation.  
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would be raised by the denial of that right.41 Indeed, serious questions can be raised by 
the denial of that right under existing law. 
But none of this is an argument about marriage as such. So long as official 
marriage exists, the state might be permitted to say that marriage is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the enjoyment of certain benefits, privileges, and default rules.42 
Indeed, one argument for marriage is that the institution allows the ready creation of 
default rules for otherwise unprovided-for cases.43 If official marriage were abolished, the 
due process clause might give people a right to some of the benefits and arrangements to 
which married people are ordinarily entitled under existing state law. But this point does 
not suggest a right to marriage as such. I conclude that government is under no 
constitutional duty to recognize marriage as a way of giving economic, associational, or 
other material benefits to married couples.  
What else, then, might an affirmative right to marry entail? The only possible 
answer is expressive—a kind of official endorsement or recognition of the marital 
relationship as such. Recall that in Turner, the Court stressed that marriages are 
“expressions of emotional support and public commitment.” If a state says that people are 
“married,” then they are in fact married, and not only for purposes of financial and other 
benefits. They are married in the sense that the relationship is taken, by everyone who 
knows about it, to have a particular quality as an official matter. In short, marriage has an 
important signaling function, and quite apart from material benefits, the official 
institution of marriage entails a certain public legitimation and endorsement. 
Consider two people who announce to the world that they are married, or who 
seem to act as married couples do, or both, but with one wrinkle: Under state law, they 
are not in fact married. (Suppose too that they have not been married through any formal 
ceremony, religious or otherwise.) To be sure, people can become “engaged” simply by 
announcing that fact. But to be married as a matter of formal law, they have to go through 
certain official procedures.44 Does the right to marry mean that the Constitution requires 
states to make those procedures available? Perhaps it does. If so, the right to marry has 
                                                 
41 Compare Troxel, supra note. 
42 But it might not be permitted to say that marriage is a necessary condition. See, e.g., Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
43 See Mary Inn Case, to be added. 
44 I put to one side the interesting case of common law marriages. 
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some of the features of the public forum doctrine, which requires the government to leave 
the streets and parks open for expressive activity. In the leading case from the early part 
of the twentieth century, the Court said, “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, 
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, 
have been used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”45  
It is not entirely clear that the public forum doctrine forbids the government from 
privatizing the streets and parks; but this view far from implausible. If we attend to the 
purposes of the public forum doctrine, perhaps public streets and parks are 
constitutionally required, so as to ensure something like “public spaces” in which free 
expression can occur. Without such spaces, the system of free expression would be badly 
compromised.46 Perhaps marriage can be understood in similar terms. On this view, states 
are under an obligation to make the marital form available—not to give married people 
economic advantages, but to give official recognition and endorsement to the marital 
relationship. And on this view, what is at stake, in the right to marry, is expressive rather 
than material.  
But on reflection this argument seems unconvincing—and hence there is probably 
no right to the institution of marriage as such. We are speaking here of fundamental 
rights, and rights protected under that rubric are generally rights to be free from 
government intrusion; they do not require affirmative provision by the state.47 The right 
to choose abortion, for example, forbids the state to impose legal barriers to the right to 
choose, but it does not require the state to fund abortion.48 For the ordinary privacy rights 
with which marriage is associated, the Constitution requires governmental 
noninterference; it does not require government to provide money, institutional 
arrangements, or anything else.  
                                                 
45 See Hague v CIO, 307 US 496 (1939). 
46 See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (2001). 
47 See Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980). There are important 
qualifications. The right to private property and freedom of contract, for example, require affirmative 
government action. See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1999). I am speaking 
here in the conventional doctrinal terms. 
48 Id.  
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Of course this analogy is not decisive. We could imagine a ruling to the effect that 
the legal institution of marriage is so time-honored, and so indispensable to family 
formation, that states must make it available. But this argument would be likely to fall on 
deaf ears in any situation in which marriage really was abolished. To see why, note the 
difficulty, at the present time, of imagining a state that has actually abolished the legal 
institution of marriage. This is difficult to imagine simply because most people cherish 
that institution. If a state abolished marriage, it would be because most people, or most 
influential people, had come to believe that the institution should be abolished. In those 
circumstances, the idea that there is a right to that institution would be difficult to accept. 
I conclude, then, that whatever the content of the right to marry, it does not include a 
right that the state maintain an official scheme for recognizing and legitimating marriage. 
B. Outlawing Marriage? Private Marriages, Public Marriages 
The argument thus far does not suggest that the state may “outlaw” the institution 
of marriage without offense to the Constitution. Suppose, for example, that a state said 
not merely that it would not recognize marriages as such, but also that it would not permit 
private organizations, religious and otherwise, to recognize marriages. (Why would a 
state do this? Any answer would be fanciful under present circumstances, but perhaps we 
could imagine a decision that the institution causes more harm than good—an issue to 
which I will return.) The initial question, a hard one, is what exactly this means. Suppose 
that it is essentially expressive and terminological—that by banning marriages, the state 
is not forbidding civil unions or relational commitments via contract. If so, the ban on 
marriages is not so different, analytically, from a refusal to recognize marriage as an 
official matter. But suppose a state went further, deciding that it really sought to “forbid 
marriage,” among other things by refusing to allow its ordinary background law to be 
used to create the expressive and economic equivalents of marriage. As stated, this very 
idea is obscure, but suppose that the state abolishes not only material benefits, but also an 
effort to recreate, through private contract, the expressive and material equivalents of 
state-sponsored marriage.49 
                                                 
49 Virginia has apparently tried to do this in the case of same-sex marriages; see below. I am grateful to 
Elizabeth Emens for bring this peculiar statute to my attention. 
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Here it is reasonable to say that a serious constitutional problem would be raised 
under the “right to marry” cases—at least as these are informed by cases recognizing a 
(narrow) right to intimate association.50 To be sure, people do not have a right to contract 
on whatever terms they choose, and the state has a great deal of power to intrude into 
contractual relationships. But it is most doubtful that the Court would permit states to 
abolish the formalization of intimate relationships through voluntary agreements. Surely 
any such effort would be unconstitutional, under the free exercise clause, as applied to 
religious institutions. And the due process clause would almost certainly be taken to 
invalidate efforts to forbid nonreligious “unions” created solely for expressive purposes. 
Thus the constitutional right to marry does not only provide access to an official 
institution; it also forbids state efforts to interfere with certain private arrangements that 
recognize what the parties consider to be the marital form. 
C. What the Right to Marry Is 
My conclusion is that the “right to marry” entails both some right of intimate 
association in the private sphere and (more relevantly for present purposes) an individual 
right of access to the official institution of marriage so long as the state is providing that 
institution. With respect to the access right, the best analogy is to the right to vote. As the 
Constitution is now understood, states are not required to provide elections for state 
offices.51 But when elections are held, the right to vote qualifies as fundamental, and state 
laws that deprive people of that right will be strictly scrutinized and generally struck 
down. The analogy between the right to marry and the right to vote is quite close. In both 
cases, the state may not be required to create the practice in the first instance. But so long 
as the practice exists, the state must make it available to everyone.  
The major difference is that the right to vote is unambiguously protected under 
the “fundamental rights” branch of equal protection doctrine,52 whereas the right to marry 
has not been squarely placed there, rather than under the due process clause. And insofar 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003); Moore v. City of Easy Cleveland, 431 US 494 
(1977).  
51 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 US 
533 (1964). 
52 See, e.g., id. 
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as the Court has suggested that the right to marry has due process foundations, that right 
does emerge as unusual, even unique. The due process clause provides, substantively, no 
other right to an institution that government is permitted to abolish. Substantive due 
process rights in the same general area, such as the right to freedom from governmental 
interference in the domain of consensual sex, are very different. As I have said, those 
rights involve a right to freedom from government intrusion, rather than a right of access 
to state-created practice. And this very point suggests that the Court has erred insofar as it 
has treated the right to marry as part of substantive due process rather than as part of the 
fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine. The latter course is a far more 
sensible way of analyzing the question. Apparently the Court went off track because of 
the intuitive connection between sexuality and reproduction (protected by substantive due 
process) and marriage (not easily analyzed in the same terms). I conclude, then, that the 
right to marry should be seen as part of the fundamental rights branch of equal protection 
doctrine, rather than as substantive due process. 
But this conclusion raises a serious question of its own. Why does the right to 
marry so qualify? In fact it is not at all easy to explain, in general, why some rights 
qualify as fundamental for equal protection purposes. The equal protection clause seems 
to forbid certain kinds of diffentiation; it does not appear to create fundamental rights of 
any kind. With the right to vote, perhaps we can say that the answer is internal to the right 
itself: The right to vote, to count as such, must be provided equally to all. On a plausible 
view, political equality and the right to vote should be taken to entail one another. If some 
people are not permitted to vote, or if effective barriers are created so as to ensure that 
some people’s votes count more than others, or if the right of access to voting is 
compromised, then the idea of political equality is undermined; and that idea is integral to 
the voting itself. I do not mean to say that this argument is ultimately convincing. I mean 
only to suggest that if the right to vote qualifies as fundamental for equal protection 
purposes, it is because there is something in that right that, by its very nature, calls for 
equality in its distribution. 
The same cannot be said of the right to marry. There is nothing internal to that 
right that calls for its equal distribution. If the right to marry qualifies as fundamental for 
equal protection purposes, it must be simply by virtue of its importance—an idea that 
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does have resonances in some of the fundamental rights cases under the equal protection 
clause.53 But this idea itself raises further complexities. On what scale of importance does 
marriage so qualify, when welfare benefits and housing do not (as the Court has held54)? 
Perhaps we can answer that importance as such is not all that is involved, and that the 
central idea is that for interests of certain kinds—perhaps those connected with family 
formation—the state is under an obligation of powerful justification whenever it imposes 
selective restrictions or curtailments.  
 Suppose that this answer is accepted. It remains to ask what, in particular, it is 
about the right to marry that makes it special in a constitutionally relevant sense. The first 
answer, a tempting one, would point to the material incidents of marriage. As I have 
noted, a large number of benefits accompany the marital relationship. Some of these can 
be provided by explicit agreements, but others (such as tax benefits and family leave 
benefits) require official marriage. But on reflection, these material benefits cannot be the 
basis for the view that marriage counts as a fundamental right. Material benefits of the 
most fundamental kind are involved in many programs involving welfare, housing, and 
subsistence; and under current doctrine, they do not qualify as fundamental for equal 
protection purposes.55 Hence it would be extremely odd to say that the marital benefits of 
marriage are by themselves enough to qualify the right to marry for the status of a 
fundamental right. 
A second answer, suggested by Zablocki, is that marriage is a legal precondition 
for certain other rights that do have constitutional status, including the right to engage in 
sexual relations and to procreate. And if Zablocki is taken at face value, this answer is 
certainly plausible. But it faces two serious problems. The first is Turner, which 
understands the right to marry in terms that have nothing to do with the enjoyment of 
other privacy rights. The second is Lawrence v. Texas,56 which recognizes a freestanding 
right to engage in sexual relations—a right that exists outside of the context of marriage. 
In the end, this second answer is impossible to accept, even though it is supported by 
some of the language of Zablocki. 
                                                 
53 See Skinner v, Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942). 
54 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471 (1970); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 US 56 (1972). 
55 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471 (1970); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 US 56 (1972). 
56 539 US 558 (2003). 
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All this leaves only one possibility: The right to marry counts as fundamental, for equal 
protection purposes, because of the expressive benefits that come from official, state-
licensed marriage. Those benefits underlie the Court’s decisions. In a sense, this too is an 
odd conclusion. In no other context is a purely or even largely expressive reason a 
sufficient basis for giving special constitutional protection to an interest. And the 
expressive benefits of marriage are hardly inevitable; they are contingent on a particular 
constellation of social norms. In a different society, for example, the expressive benefits 
would be much lower. In fact American society is moving in that direction, for the 
expressive benefits of marriage are, in many parts of the nation, less significant than they 
were a half-century ago. All I am suggesting is that the right to marry cannot be 
understood without reference to the fundamental importance of the expressive interests at 
stake—and that those benefits lie at the heart of the Court’s decisions. 
III. Of Symbolic and Material Incidents of Marriage 
A. The Content of the Right 
I have said that as a matter of state law, the institution of marriage contains both 
material and expressive incidents. And the discussion thus far should be enough to 
suggest that when the Supreme Court says that there is a right to marriage, it is not 
claiming that there is merely a right to the material incidents of marriage. Suppose that a 
white person and an African-American seek to marry, and that a state says that such 
relationships can be formed as civil unions but not as marriages. Suppose too that civil 
unions have all the legal incidents of marriage. It is clear that under Loving, this form of 
discrimination would be violative of the due process clause as well as the equal 
protection clause. The state cannot deny interracial couples the right to marry merely by 
insisting that it is providing such couples with the right to the material incidents of 
marriage. So too, a state could not say that unless they have met their child support 
obligations, people may enter into civil unions but not marriage.  
Nor—though the question is harder—could a state agree to provide, for some 
rather than all, the expressive benefits of marriage but not its material ones. Certainly a 
state could not say that mixed race couples can “marry,” but without receiving the 
20 
material advantages that normally flow from marriage. What makes this question more 
difficult is that it is imaginable that a state could legitimately vary the material benefits of 
marriage with features of that particular marriage. A state might say, for example, that 
people who have been married for a certain period of time qualify for community 
property arrangements—but not until that time has passed. More controversially, perhaps 
a state might say that those who owe child support obligations may marry, but that the 
amounts due, for child support, supersede any spousal rights. Nothing in Zablocki says 
that adjustments of this kind are unconstitutional. But—and this is my central point—
such adjustments must be tailored to relevant facts about the situation; the material 
benefits of marriage cannot be used as a weapon by which to penalize some and to 
reward others. Hence the Court’s opinions seem to mean that for those who enjoy it, the 
right to marry conveys a right of access to the symbolic and the material benefits of 
marriage, so long as the institution of marriage exists. In the cases involving the right to 
marriage, and subject to the qualifications just given, a denial of either the symbolic or 
the material benefits of marriage would be impermissible. 
B. Permissions and Prohibitions 
Notwithstanding the Court’s rhetoric, however, it is implausible to suggest that 
the Court meant to raise serious questions about all state laws dictating who may enter 
into a marital relationship. To approach the question, and to prepare the way for a 
discussion of the scope of the right to marry, we need to distinguish among two 
possibilities.  
1. The state does not allow certain people to enter into the marital relationship as 
that relationship is officially understood, but it does not ban those people from 
conducting unofficial marriage ceremonies and even from holding themselves out 
as married, so long as they do not seek the material benefits that flow from 
official recognition of that status.  
2. The state does not allow certain people to enter into the marital relationship as 
officially understood; it also outlaws, through criminal or civil sanctions, the 
performance of marriage ceremonies by such people, and bans them from holding 
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themselves out as married. The state might, for example, deem it a crime for 
siblings, or people of the same sex, to hold marriage ceremonies. 
The first approach involves a mere refusal to recognize certain marriages; the 
second involves a prohibition on them. It should be obvious that the two must be treated 
differently.  
1. A little law. As an official matter, state laws distinguish among marriages that 
are void, voidable, and criminal. When a marriage is void, it is invalid from its inception. 
In Illinois, for example same-sex marriages are void,57 as are those which are 
incestuous58 or polygamous.59 In New York, polygamous and incestuous marriages are 
void from inception.60 Incestuous marriages are defined to include those between an 
ancestor and descendant; brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood; an uncle and a 
niece or an aunt and a nephew. (Marriages between cousins are legitimate under New 
York law.) Notably, one state—Virginia—puzzlingly voids not only same-sex marriages 
but contracts designed to create same-sex unions. “A civil union, partnership contract or 
other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or 
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other 
arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall 
be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void 
and unenforceable.”61  
Some marriages, while not void, can be annulled at the behest of either spouse. 
Marriages are voidable if they occurred under duress (through coercion, fraud, or the 
threat of force) or if one member is either physically or mentally incapable of entering 
into the marriage relation.62 For fraud, many courts apply a strict test, “requiring that the 
                                                 
57 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212 (2004); See, for example, In Re Flores, 421 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. 1981). 
58 See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-1. 
59 See 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212 (2004) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 4. 
60 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 5-6 (Consol. 2004) 
61 Code of Virginia § 20-45.3. This provision contains a good deal of ambiguity. What does it mean for 
a contract to purport “to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage”? Insofar as those privileges or 
obligations can be granted by positive law, and not by voluntary agreement, no contract could bestow them. 
On the other hand, some of those privileges and obligations – for example, the right to make decisions in 
one’s stead in the event of incapacitation – might be provided by ordinary contracts. It is not clear whether 
the Virginia statute is intended to make those contracts “void” in the case of same-sex relationships. 
62 Id. § 7. 
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misrepresentation go to the ‘essentials’ to render the marriage voidable.”63 Others merely 
require that the fraud be material to the marriage.64 Violation of the minimal age 
requirement typically makes a marriage voidable. In New York, if either spouse is under 
age 18 at the time of the marriage, then the marriage is voidable for lack of consent.65 
And if either spouse has an incurable mental illness, then the marriage can be voided at 
either party’s request.66 Frequently physical incapacity, defined as the inability to have 
sexual relations, renders a marriage voidable; the inability must exist at the time of 
marriage and be incurable.  
There are also criminal sanctions for entering into some marriages. In New York, 
a person commits the crime of “incest when he or she marries … a person whom he or 
she knows to be related to him or her, either legitimately or out of wedlock, as an 
ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, 
nephew or niece.”67 Other states similarly criminalize incestuous marriages.68 It follows 
that to commit incest, sexual relations with a relative are not necessary; marrying one 
suffices for criminal liability. In New York, the crime of bigamy is defined more 
precisely than incest. “A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to 
contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the 
other person has a living spouse.”69 
2. Relevant differences: bans vs. nonrecognition. Is there a difference, for 
constitutional purposes, among criminalizing a marriage, making it void, and making it 
voidable? In principle there should be. One reason that marriages are voidable is that 
there is a problem with consent; and if one of the parties complains that consent was 
absent, there is no constitutional problem with taking the complaint seriously. And if a 
state refuses to recognize certain marriages, it might be doing so because of its desire not 
to confer the economic benefits of marriages in circumstances in which such benefits are 
                                                 
63 D. Kelly Weisberg & Susan Appleton, Modern Family Law: Cases and Materials 218 (2d Ed. 1998). 
64 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7 (Consol. 2004); see also Sabbagh v. Copti, 251 A.D.2d 149 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998) (holding that misleading a wife into marrying by pretending to want children was grounds for 
an annulment). 
65 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7 (Consol. 2004). 
66 Id. 
67 N.Y. Penal § 255.25 (Consol. 2004) 
68 See, for example, Cal. Penal Code § 285 (West 2004), Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-27 (2004), and 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 17 (2004). 
69 N.Y. Penal § 255.15 (Consol. 2004). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-13 (2004). 
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not justified. A state might believe, for example, that two-person marriages provide the 
only plausible justification for many or most of those benefits. If a state refuses to confer 
the economic benefits of marriage for this reason, but fails to criminalize purely private 
marriages, the issue is surely different from what it would be if a state imposed a criminal 
ban. I am not suggesting that criminal bans on polygamy are unconstitutional70; I am 
suggesting only that a refusal to license marriages is less intrusive than a criminal ban. 
In many cases, a state might believe, not that those who participate in certain 
marriages should be subject to criminal sanctions, but that it does not want to confer 
expressive legitimacy on those marriages. It might believe, for example, that same-sex 
marriages do not deserve the same social approval as opposite-sex marriages; hence 
many people think that same-sex couples should be permitted to enter into civil unions 
but not into marriage. It would be possible to think that states have an adequate 
justification for rendering marriages void but not for banning them, if they are performed 
by private organizations, religious or otherwise. We have seen that a prohibition on 
private religious ceremonies, allowing for example same-sex marriages, would raise 
serious questions under the free exercise clause; and a ban on private ceremonies, even 
without a religious component, would raise questions of substantive due process. 
To say this is not to say that existing criminal prohibitions are generally or even 
mostly invalid.  In general, the ban on incestuous marriages could be defended by 
pointing to the risk of coercion and the danger to any children who would result.71 But it 
is easy to imagine some cases in which any such defense would be weak—as, for 
example, where the would-be spouses are both adults and do not plan to have children. 
Perhaps bans on polygamy could be defended by pointing to the risk of exploitation, 
especially of the women involved.72 It is easy to imagine a claim that if polygamy is 
permitted, women will be subordinated as a result. But this claim might be contested, and 
in any case we might doubt whether Loving and Zablocki should be read to require a 
careful judicial inquiry into that question. That doubt makes it necessary to turn to the 
question of the scope of the right to marry.  
                                                 
70 They were upheld in Reynolds v. US,, 98 US 145 (1879). 
71 For skeptical remarks on those harms, see Courtney Cahill, "What is Our Bane, That Alone We 
Have in Common': Incest, Intimacy, and the Crisis of Naming, 21 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 3 
(Austin Sarat, ed. 2000). 
72 But see Emens, supra note. 
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IV. The Minimal Right to Marry 
Begin with a minimal understanding of the scope of the relevant right. By 
deeming the right to marry fundamental, the Court did not mean to suggest that it would 
strictly scrutinize any law that departed from the traditional idea that a marriage is 
between (one) woman and (one) man. It meant only to say that when a man and a woman 
seek to marry, the state must have exceedingly good reasons for putting significant 
barriers in their path. Thus the minimal understanding of the right to marry says that 
without very good reason, states may not deny an adult man and an adult woman access 
to the institution of marriage. This rationale has the advantage of fitting with the results in 
Loving, Zablocki, and Turner. It has the further advantage of not drawing into questions 
bans on polygamous marriages or marriages between people and cats.  
A. Problems and Conventions 
But the minimal understanding does have two problems. First, it might turn out to 
be less minimal than it appears, for one simple reason: It raises serious questions about 
bans on incestuous marriages. If this problem is deemed serious, two options are 
available. The right might be described more narrowly still: without very good reason, 
states may not deny an adult man and an adult woman access to the institution of 
marriage, unless the relevant marriage runs afoul of longstanding views about who may 
enter into the marital relationship. This extra-minimalist understanding of the right to 
marry also fits with the Court’s decisions, and it would ensure that the Court would 
uphold any restriction that is not novel (as were those in Zablocki and Turner)—a benefit 
for those who believe in a cautious judicial role in this domain. Alternatively, bans on 
incestuous marriages might be permitted only if they can be compellingly justified—and 
struck down if they cannot be. Thus, for example, an uncle might not be permitted to 
marry his niece simply because of the risk of coercion and psychological harm. But a ban 
on marriage between cousins might well be struck down. 
 The second problem with the minimal understanding is much more formidable. 
The lines it draws seem arbitrary in principle. Why, exactly, should the right to marry be 
limited in this way? Why, in any case, should the definition be such as to require the state 
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to give a strong justification for any law that forbids marriage between one woman and 
one man—but not to give a strong justification for any other law that impinges on marital 
choices? 
A possible answer would be that marriage is a legal status, one whose scope 
depends on nothing more than conventions. The Court, on this view, has not been willing 
to revisit the question what marriage is; it has worked entirely within the convention on 
that count. But are conventions really determinative? Suppose that a white person and an 
African-American seek to marry, and a state responds (in, say, 1965) that they cannot 
marry, because marriage is defined as, or is conventionally understood as, a legal 
relationship between people of the same race. The mere fact that there is a convention to 
this effect cannot be decisive. The convention is constitutionally unacceptable. There are 
countless conventions, and their legal legitimacy depends on whether they fit with the 
Constitution; their status as conventions cannot resolve that question.  
But perhaps this conclusion depends fundamentally on the antidiscrimination 
principles of the equal protection clause. Perhaps the convention is authoritative unless it 
draws distinctions that offend that clause. Compare the idea of “parent,” insofar as that 
idea has legal relevance. If I am the biological parent of a child, the state must have an 
extremely good reason to sever my relationship with that child. If I have adopted a child, 
the state must do the same. But suppose that someone claims that he wants to be “father” 
of his dog, or his horse, or his best friend, or his grandfather. (What does this mean? 
Suppose it means that the claimant seeks the expressive benefits of being a parent, the 
material benefits and burdens of parenthood, or both.) The prohibition on parental status, 
in such cases, need not be compellingly justified.73 Perhaps it is sufficient to say that to 
be a parent, it is necessary to fit within certain conventional categories. But I do not think 
that this is sufficient. If the convention, with respect to parenthood, drew invidious or 
irrational lines, it would be impermissible. If there is a distinction in terms of liberty 
alone, the real point is that for a biological or adoptive parent, state intervention imposes 
a loss that is distinctive in both degree and kind. That loss counts as a deprivation of 
liberty that must be compellingly justified. No such loss is involved when someone is 
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prevented from becoming the parent of his dog, or his horse, or his best friend, or his 
grandfather. (What, exactly, is lost by that?) 
Marriage is quite different. If a man is told that he cannot marry another man, it is 
not so frivolous to suggest that the same loss is imposed on him as in Loving, Zablocki, 
and Turner. The same may well be true if someone is told that she cannot have two 
spouses. The claim here is not that the relevant restrictions are unconstitutional. It is only 
that they cannot be defended by reference to convention alone.  
B. Due Process Traditionalism 
Apart from convention, what might be said in favor of the minimal understanding 
of the right to marry? The initial answer would be rooted in constitutional traditionalism. 
The central claim would be that in its substantive form, the due process clause is 
backward-looking; it requires the state to justify any departure from longstanding views 
about individual rights.74 This view can find its foundation in Justice Holmes’ famous 
dissenting opinion in the Lochner case, where he urged not that substantive process 
should be eliminated, but that it should apply only in cases involving departures from 
longstanding traditions.75 Justice Holmes’ position was prominently reiterated in Bowers 
v. Hardwick76 and Washington v. Gluckberg,77 where the Court suggested that the reach 
of the due process clause should be defined with close reference to American traditions. 
And it is not difficult to understand why the Court might see the due process clause in 
this way. A decision to root substantive due process in traditions, narrowly understood, 
might be the best way of reducing judicial mistakes and judicial burdens (in economic 
terminology, the costs of errors and the costs of decisions). Let us see how this argument 
might be spelled out.  
The idea of “substantive due process” is textually awkward, to say the least,78 and 
doubts about its constitutional legitimacy might well lead the Court to attempt to reduce 
its reach. Quite apart from the textual problem, the notion of substantive due process 
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seems hard to cabin. Which liberty rights count as special, for due process purposes? If 
this question is not easy to answer, the Court might be drawn to due process 
traditionalism simply as a way of sharply disciplining itself. Of course traditions are not 
self-defining; they do not come prepackaged for easy identification.79 And hence it is 
tempting to object that constitutional traditionalism is a fraud, in which the key value 
judgment—how should the tradition be defined?—ends up doing all the work.80 But the 
objection is overstated. If traditions are understood at the lowest possible level of 
abstraction,81 then their use does impose a real limitation on judicial discretion. We 
should be able to agree, for example, that in the United States, there is no tradition of 
respect for incestuous marriages, or homosexual marriages, or marriages that involve 
more than two people. Thus the emphasis on tradition, described at a maximum 
specificity, might be defended on the ground that it reduces the burdens of judicial 
judgment, making substantive due process into something much closer to a system of 
rules.82 
On a plausible view, moreover, the discipline imposed by tradition is far from 
arbitrary. Suppose that we believe, with Edmund Burke,83 that traditions are likely to be 
wise, simply because they represent the judgment not of a single person, but of countless 
people over long period of time. If so, then traditions have some of the advantages of 
markets, reflecting as they do the assessments of many rather than few. To say this is not 
to say that longstanding practices are always justified. They might reflect prejudice or 
unjustified inequalities in power rather than wisdom. But perhaps practices are likely to 
be longstanding only if they serve important social interests; if so, there should be a 
presumption in their favor. It is certainly not senseless to say that if American states have 
generally refused to recognize certain marriages, there is reason to think that the refusal 
has some sense behind it.  
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In any case the question is not whether longstanding practices always deserve 
support, measured against the best answer to that question on the merits. The question is 
instead an insistently comparative one: For judges interpreting the due process clause, is 
constitutional traditionalism preferable to an alternative approach, in which, for example, 
judges pay close attention to their own judgments about liberty, or judgments of an 
evolving public?84 If we believe that judges are prone to err, an effort to root substantive 
due process in traditions might well be better than any alternative. Seen in this light, due 
process traditionalism has a kind of rule-utilitarian defense. Compared to other 
approaches, it may be likely to reduce both the costs of decision and the costs of error. 
And even if we believed that judicial decisions have some advantages, we might agree 
that in the face of doubt, democratic judgments, especially in a federal system, deserve a 
measure of respect, in part because self-government is one of the rights to which people 
are entitled. 
For all of these reasons, due process traditionalism is far from irrational or 
arbitrary, even if it produces results that can be so characterized in particular cases. And 
if we are due process traditionalists, we might insist that if there is a right to marry, it 
includes only the time-honored form: one man and one woman. On this reading, Loving 
v. Virginia is best seen as a simple equal protection ruling; if it has a substantive due 
process component as well, this is because the ban on racial intermarriage offended the 
minimal understanding. But even if it can be defended in principle, due process 
traditionalism has a serious doctrinal obstacle: Lawrence v. Texas.85 Any judgment about 
the scope of the right to marry must come to terms with what the Court said in Lawrence; 
and this is no simple matter. 
C. Of Autonomy and Desuetude 
The simplest point is that in Lawrence, the Court expressly rejected the idea that 
substantive due process is limited to practices that have long received respect. Striking 
down a state law forbidding same-sex relationships, the Court freely conceded that there 
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is no history of accepting those relationships. On the contrary, and in a dramatic 
departure from both Bowers and Glucksberg, the Court said that longstanding traditions 
are not decisive. Current convictions are important, not old ones. “[W]e think that our 
laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”86 Hence the Court 
stressed an “emerging recognition that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”87 
On its face, of course, this conclusion does not bear on the right to marry. Perhaps 
there is a distinction between “matters pertaining to sex,” properly conceived as private, 
and the marital institution, which requires official decisions by the state. But Lawrence 
raises some problems for a minimal understanding of the right to marry. It suggests that 
due process traditionalism is dead—and hence that the minimal understanding of that 
right cannot be defended by reference to tradition alone. 
On the other hand, a narrow reading of Lawrence, one that also confines the reach 
of substantive due process, is possible. Perhaps a right qualifies for substantive protection 
under the due process clause either if it has a claim in longstanding traditions or if it is 
firmly rooted in society’s “emerging recognition.”88 Of course this view has serious 
problem of its own. Is the Court reliably able to identify emerging recognitions? And if 
some recognition really is emerging, might it not be vindicated democratically, rather 
than judicially? Why should the Supreme Court, rather than legislatures, have the task of 
insisting on emerging recognitions? One answer would see Lawrence as a case about an 
American version of desuetude89—as a prohibition on the use of the criminal law in 
circumstances in which the underlying conduct did not offend citizen’s moral 
commitments, as reflected in a pattern of nonenforcement. In those circumstances, the 
statutory ban in Lawrence was a recipe for arbitrary and even discriminatory action, in a 
way that does violence to democratic ideals and even the rule of law. It does violence to 
democratic ideals because a law plainly lacking public support is nonetheless invoked to 
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regulate private conduct. It violates the rule of law because a measure of this kind lacks, 
in practice, the kind of generality and predictability on which the rule of law depends.90 
If this is the foundation for Lawrence, then the decision, while fatal to due process 
traditionalism, is not at all fatal to the minimal reading of the right to marry. It is not fatal 
to that reading because no problem of desuetude is involved. Indeed, no such problem is 
involved even if the idea of desuetude could be extended beyond the criminal law. Even 
if so, refusal to recognize marriages that exceed the minimal understanding are now 
widely accepted and therefore acceptable. Indeed, we might read Lawrence as reaching 
beyond the realm of desuetude to embody a general project of judicial modernization, 
involving not simply substantive due process but equal protection and cruel and unusual 
punishment as well.91 But even if that general project is embraced (of course a 
controversial matter), it does not justify, at the present time, judicial rulings that go 
beyond the minimal understanding of the right to marry. 
D. Rationality, Arbitrariness, Invidiousness 
Lawrence has a great deal of ambiguity, and some people might be tempted to 
understand the decision in a way that suggests a broad autonomy principle,92 one that 
might well jeopardize the minimal understanding. To clarify the issue, imagine a 
maximal understanding of the scope of the right to marry: two or more people have a 
right of access to the marital relationship, with its expressive and material incidents, 
unless the relevant restriction is supported by compelling justifications. And it should not 
be so difficult to imagine a parallel world, perhaps not so radically different from our 
own, in which the maximal understanding were accepted. In such a world, people could 
deem themselves married, and receive the appropriate license from the state, so long as 
force and fraud were not involved. In that world, religious marriages and official 
licensing would be entirely severed. Approval and disapproval would operate through 
norms, not through law. Should this understanding be accepted? What would be the 
implications? 
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For many two-person marriages that are currently void, voidable, or criminal, 
compelling justifications for restricting marriage are present, and hence the relevant 
prohibitions would be upheld even under the maximal understanding. Thus prohibitions 
on nonconsensual marriages are plainly legitimate; so too with marriages involving 
people who are underage; so too with most incestuous marriages. Just as under the 
minimal understanding, some incestuous marriages would be in trouble under the 
maximal understanding; but most would not. The real difference between the minimal 
and the maximal understanding operates along only two dimensions. First, the latter 
eliminates the numerosity requirement.93 Second, the latter eliminates the ban on same-
sex marriages. There is no sign that the first step will attract any interest from federal or 
state judges; the second step is of course an active area of controversy, at least in the state 
courts and in democratic arenas.94 
 If the maximal understanding were adopted, the numerosity requirement would 
come under severe pressure. Put to one side the fact that it is fanciful to suppose that such 
pressure might be imposed in the near future. What would happen if it were? The 
question is whether states could produce compelling justifications for refusing to 
recognize marriages of three or more people. An initial justification would suggest that 
many of the material benefits of marriage make sense only for couples. To come to terms 
with this justification, we would have to go through those benefits one by one. Very 
likely, federal and state governments would be able to support their refusal to give joint 
filing privileges to four-person “marriages”; such privileges might produce substantial tax 
benefits, perhaps for no sufficient reason. Perhaps states could compellingly justify the 
decision to withhold some, but not all, of the material incidents of marriage from 
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polygamous relationships. But even if so, the maximal understanding might nonetheless 
require states to recognize certain relationships as “marital” for expressive reasons. In 
other words, acceptance of the maximal understanding would make it necessary to 
distinguish between the material and expressive incidents of marriage—and also to treat 
the various material incidents as distinct.  
 But these points do not capture the real reason that polygamous relationships 
cannot be deemed “marriages.” Note here that most states do not merely refuse to 
recognize them as such; they also impose criminal penalties on those participate in them. 
All this is because the state believes that polygamous relationships cause individual and 
social harm and in any case are immoral. Under the maximal understanding, however, 
states must produce compelling justifications for the relevant laws.95 Should they be 
required to do so?  
I do not believe so. A central reason is institutional; the maximal understanding 
would put courts in a position for which they are extremely ill-suited. It would require 
them to assume the exceptionally difficult task of policing the adequacy of official 
justifications for refusing to recognize marriages that involve more than two people. 
Those justifications are best evaluated democratically, not judicially. If this objection is 
convincing, then we can imagine an intermediate understanding of the scope of the right 
to marry: two adults have a right of access to the marital relationship, with its expressive 
and material incidents, unless the relevant restriction is supported by compelling 
justifications. Is this understanding preferable from the constitutional point of view? How 
should that question be answered? 
E. From Due Process to Equal Protection 
One route is doctrinal. In specifying the scope of the right to marry, the real 
question is the legitimacy of the lines that states are drawing. If that is the question, it is 
appropriate to consult not the due process clause, but the antidiscrimination principles of 
the equal protection clause, which is the provision that places certain forms of line-
drawing in constitutional doubt. In fact the due process clause is ill-adapted, almost 
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comically so, to making an assessment of appropriate lines. By contrast, that assessment 
is a central part of the historic office of the equal protection clause. 
If there is a problem with minimal understandings of the scope of the right to 
marry, it is that those understandings draw lines that are either arbitrary or invidious. 
Those who object to the relevant lines are making arguments about equality; and no one 
can deny that Lawrence had a great deal to do with equality. And this is entirely 
appropriate, simply because the equal protection clause is a self-conscious repudiation of 
traditions that embody illicit line-drawing, making distinctions that are arbitrary or 
invidious.96 The equal protection clause stands for a commitment to public reason-giving 
that puts traditions to the test. As I have noted, the due process clause has had a quite 
different function. The purpose of that clause has generally been to protect time-honored 
practices from governmental intrusion. The due process clause, in short, is the 
Constitution’s bow in the direction of Burke; the equal protection clause is its testimonial 
to the French Revolution. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not consistently adhered to this distinction. Far 
from it. In Lawrence in particular, the Court was willing to understand the due process 
clause in a way that understood the tradition by reference to evolving values—and hence 
that generalized the tradition, rather than relying on the specific judgments that it had 
long made. If we put the awkwardness of the whole idea of substantive due process to 
one side, there is no a priori reason to think that this is an unacceptable use of the due 
process clause. But notice that if the clause is to be used in this way, it is really because 
of a kind of equal protection component to the due process inquiry—one that involves an 
evaluation, by federal courts, of the lines that traditions have drawn. If so, then the due 
process inquiry, testing the legitimacy of relevant lines, replicates the equal protection 
inquiry, but in a more indirect form. Perhaps it is appropriate for federal courts, under the 
due process clause, to posit some general value (say, sexual autonomy) and to assess 
particular practices in light of that value. But at least there is some sense in being direct 
and explicit about the matter—of acknowledging that an equality norm is being brought 
to bear on the question whether the tradition should be understood at a level of great 
specificity or a somewhat higher level of abstraction. I am suggesting, then, the 
                                                 
96 This argument is sketched in Cass R. Sunstein, supra note. 
34 
judgments about the scope of the right to marry ought to be made with close attention to 
the equal protection clause. 
Do bans on same-sex marriage violate that clause?97 To answer that question, we 
have to distinguish the question of constitutional principle from the question of 
appropriate judicial decisions. In principle, I believe that it is very hard to defend this 
form of discrimination against gays and lesbians in constitutionally acceptable terms. 
What sorts of social harms would follow from recognizing marriages between people of 
the same sex? It is conventional to argue that the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage 
is a way of protecting the marital institution itself. If same-sex marriages were permitted, 
perhaps marriage itself would be endangered, at least in its traditional form. But aside 
from simple semantic arguments, this is very puzzling; how do same-sex marriages 
threaten the institution of marriage? Extending the right to enter into marriage would not 
seem to endanger traditional marriages—unless it were thought that significant numbers 
of heterosexuals would forego traditional marriages if gay and lesbian marriages were 
permitted (a difficult causal argument, to say the least). Or perhaps same-sex marriages 
would harm children—an empirical claim on which there is much dispute. Do we really 
have enough evidence of harm to justify a ban? 
Countless people believe that the state can legitimately reserve the idea of 
marriage to men and women for expressive reasons. Perhaps the state can urge that it 
does not want to give the same expressive support to same-sex unions as to opposite-sex 
unions. Perhaps it does not want to “endorse” such unions or to suggest that they are 
appropriate or legitimate, or have a standing similar to that of traditional marriage. But 
why not? Why should states refuse to endorse such unions? Compare the case of 
adultery, where the defense of traditional marriage and expressive condemnation are far 
easier to understand. As compared to a ban on same-sex marriages, a prohibition on 
adultery seems simple to justify. Such a prohibition is likely, in numerous cases, to 
protect one or even both spouses, and to protect children besides. If, as seems clear, 
Lawrence draws prohibitions on adultery into some doubt, it would seem much harder to 
invoke expressive condemnation in support of prohibitions on same-sex marriage, which 
have a far weaker foundation in the goal of protecting traditional marriage.  
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For those who believe that the ban on same-sex marriages raises serious equality 
questions, a key problem is institutional. It involves appropriate judicial modesty in the 
face of strong public convictions and in particular the distinctive judicial virtue of 
prudence. As Alexander Bickel emphasized, the point is highly relevant to constitutional 
law, especially in the area of social reform.98 As it operates in the courts, constitutional 
law is a peculiar mixture of substantive theory and institutional constraint. Constitutional 
rights are systematically “underenforced” by the judiciary, and for excellent institutional 
reasons.99 Those reasons have to do with the courts' limited factfinding capacities, their 
weak democratic pedigree, their limited legitimacy, and their likely ineffectiveness as 
frequent instigators of social reform. There are strong prudential reasons for federal 
courts to hesitate in the context of same-sex marriage, no least because the issue of same-
sex marriage is under intense discussion at the local, state, and national levels—and there 
are many possibilities, ranging from diverse forms of civil unions to ordinary marriage.  
As in the context of abortion, it would be most unfortunate if the Supreme Court 
were to settle the issue at this early stage. In fact the Court gave fresh support to this idea 
in its standing decision in the Newdow case, involving a challenge to the use of the words 
“under God” in the pledge of allegiance.100 The Court emphasized that among “the 
principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of 
domestic relations.”101 It added that “in general it is appropriate for the federal courts to 
leave delicate issues of domestic relations to the state courts.”102 Much of the Court’s 
opinion stresses the need for judicial caution in the domain of family law. Some 
platitudes are worth repeating: A central advantage of a federal system is that it permits a 
wide range of experiments; a central disadvantage of centralized rules is that they 
foreclose such experiments. In the context of criminal punishments for consensual 
activity, experiments should be avoided. But in the context of marriage, a degree of 
flexibility should not be forbidden by federal courts.  
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This point connects nicely with the suggestion that the Lawrence decision was 
rooted in a kind of American-style version of desuetude. When a law has lost support in 
public convictions, judicial invalidation is least damaging to democratic goals and to the 
Court’s own institutional position. At least at this stage, the ban on same-sex marriage 
stands on much firmer footing. I emphasize my belief that in principle, such a ban raises 
serious equal protection concerns and is hard to defend in constitutionally acceptable 
terms; the objection to an aggressive ruling from federal courts has everything to do with 
their properly limited role in the constitutional structure. 
V. Against Marriage? The Surprisingly Plausible Case for Deregulation 
There is a lurking issue in the background here, one that raises even larger issues 
than those I have discussed thus far. Marriage is an official licensing scheme. Should it 
continue? Would deregulation be appropriate, here as elsewhere? 
A. Problems 
Many people have argued that the law ought to move in this direction.103 For one 
thing, the institution of marriage has a discriminatory past, enmeshed as it has been in sex 
inequality, and that this past cannot easily be severed from the current version of the 
institution.104 For another, the marital institution was originally a means of licensing both 
sexual activities and child-rearing; and it no longer has that role. For many generations, 
official marriage served to authorize people both to have sexual relationships and to have 
and to raise children. But currently this is not so; indeed, people have a constitutional 
right to have sexual relationships outside of marriage, and people become parents, 
including adoptive parents, without the benefit of the marital form. In an era in which 
marriage is not a necessary condition for sex or for children, perhaps the state’s role is no 
longer essential.  
Still others emphasize that marriage has been a means for protecting dependents, 
above all children and women; but they contend that marriage is a crude tool for 
                                                 
103 See Fineman, supra note.  
104 See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 Va L Rev 1535 (1993). 
37 
providing that protection, which could be ensured in better, more direct ways.105 Note in 
particular that a primary reason for the official institution of marriage has been less to 
limit entry (though that is certainly one of its purposes) than to police exit. If divorce is 
difficult, as a result of legal restrictions or social norms, then marriages are more likely to 
be stable. Marital stability is often desirable for children. It can also be desirable for 
spouses, who may benefit from social understandings that work against impulsive or 
destructive decisions that are detrimental to their long-term welfare. But if exit is not 
policed, through law or accompanying social norms, it is at least harder to contend that 
the official institution of marriage is valuable as a way of promoting the stability of 
relationships. And in the modern era, exit is much less rigorously policed. As a matter of 
law, at least, people can generally leave the marital form whenever they wish to do so. 
Increasingly, marriage resembles a contract, dissoluble at the will of the parties, rather 
than a permanent status. 
It is also possible to object to the freedom-limiting functions of the state’s 
licensing system. Marriage licenses divide the world into the status of those who are 
“married” and those who are “single,” in a way that produces serious economic and 
material disadvantages for the latter (and sometimes for the former). Many of these 
economic and material inequalities are not simple to defend. In any case one or the other 
status has a number of signaling functions, some of them incompatible with the desires of 
those involved. Private relationships, intimate and otherwise, might be structured in many 
different ways, and the simple dichotomy between “single” and “married” does not do 
justice to what people might choose. Indeed, that simple dichotomy is an imprecise 
description of what people actually do choose, and perhaps increasingly so.106 Many 
people are in relationships that are intimate, committed, and monogamous, but without 
the benefit of marriage. Many people are in marriages that are neither intimate nor 
monogamous. Countless variations are possible. Why not leave people’s relationships to 
their own choices, perhaps subject to the judgments of relevant intermediate 
organizations, religious and otherwise?  
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To the extent that those choices leave gaps or uncertainties, the law could choose 
a menu of default rules, perhaps intended to mimic what most people would do, perhaps 
intended to force the parties to make their wishes clear, perhaps intended to protect those 
most in need of protection. An obvious concern is the well-being of children. But private 
arrangements, religious and otherwise, might provide as much protection of children as 
official marriage does; and the protection of children might be ensured directly, through 
requirements of care and support, rather than through marriage in its current form. It is 
also possible to insist that couples benefit from public statements of commitments—that 
the official institution of marriage helps to secure people’s commitments to one another, 
in a way that is both an individual and social good. Perhaps this is so. But why is 
government licensing necessary? Might not private institutions be able to provide the 
same kinds of commitments? 
B. Thought Experiments and Parallel Worlds 
The answer is hardly clear. But beware of a simple negative answer, for the very 
familiarity of the institution of marriage might have a distorting influence. To clarify the 
problem, imagine a parallel world in which many people have official “best friends.” In 
this parallel world, the status of best friend is officially licensed. Most of the time, there 
is a happy ceremony, and the relationship is accompanied by identifiable responsibilities 
and rights, some of them acknowledged and imposed by law. A best friend might, for 
example, have some of the economic rights that spouses enjoy—for example, to help 
make decisions in the event of incapacitation. In addition, it might be understood by all 
that best friends, having achieved that (legal) status, have strong informal duties to one 
another –to give comfort amidst distress, to celebrate good developments, and to put 
personal concerns to one side, when necessary, to attend to the relationship. We could 
even imagine a sincere suggestion, in our own world, that formalization of the status of 
“best friend” would help with an array of public and private problems. Perhaps it is not 
the worst imaginable idea.  
But we could also imagine a state in this parallel world, after having lived with 
the “best friend” status for generations, now deciding that it should eliminate the 
institution, on the ground that the formalized idea of “best friend” creates excessive 
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rigidity, and that in general, people should be able to make private arrangements as they 
see fit. Radical reformers might make exactly this suggestion. If the arguments of these 
reformers were accepted, people in this society, after the reforms, would certainly be 
permitted to announce to one another that they are “best friends” or even to have private 
“best friend” ceremonies. Or they could dispense with the idea if they chose. In this 
parallel world, the abolition of the status of “best friend” would count as a genuine 
revolution. But would it clearly be a mistake to abolish official best friend licenses? 
Those who object to the official institution of marriage think that people would be better 
off, all things considered, in a system in which state licensing did not occur.  
Of course the analogy is imprecise. Very plausibly, the argument for best friend 
licenses is much weaker than the argument for marriage licenses. Consider, then, another 
parallel world, in which the relevant government has never recognized marriages, but in 
which it is possible to find a multiplicity of private arrangements. In this parallel world, 
many people are married within their religious traditions. Many others are married 
through secular institutions of one or another kind. Many couples do not marry at all. 
Monogamy is sometimes chosen; sometimes it is rejected. In this parallel world, a 
reformer proposes that states should grant licenses to couples willing to apply and who 
meet the relevant requirements. Perhaps the proposal should and will be accepted. But we 
could easily imagine a vigorous debate. The skeptics would contend that the state ought 
not to decide who can marry whom—that this is a decision for individuals and for private 
organizations. In any case, an appreciation of the grounds for their skepticism suggests 
that the case for an official, publicly administered institution of marriage is not entirely 
clear. 
C. Solemnity, Conservatism, and Official Licensing 
I am not contending that state licensing of marriage should be abolished.107 For 
countless generations, people have relied on the existence of a state licensing scheme, 
and it is hardly clear that the scheme does more harm than good. The official ceremony, 
accompanied by state licenses, contributes to a degree of solemnity that is widely 
perceived as beneficial to those involved, and that almost certainly contributes to the 
                                                 
107 See Bernstein, supra note, for detailed discussion. 
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stability of relationships, in a way that benefits adults and children alike. Perhaps the 
ceremony, along with the solemnity, can increase the likelihood that marriage will 
operate as a kind of precommitment strategy, one that increases the likelihood that 
relationships will continue. Continuing relationships can have their problems, but in 
many cases they are good for all those involved. Even with the official institution in 
place, people can organize their relationships in multiple different ways, through (for 
example) religious marriages that do not involve the state and informal understandings of 
monogamy or continuity that do not involve official marriage. Hence the institution of 
marriage seems to do considerable good; and it is not at all clear that the institution does 
much damage. 
There is an institutional point as well. For social reform, as for courts, the 
presumption should be in favor of incremental change; and abolition of state-licensed 
marriage would be anything but incremental. But it is important to understand the 
argument against official marriage, if only to show that the topic here is a form of 
government intervention, and an aggressive form too—and that there is a sharp 
distinction between religious and private marriages and marriages as recognized and 
legitimated by official licensors. What I have been discussed here is the latter, not the 
former. 
Conclusion 
 My goal has been to make progress on two questions. The first is the content of 
the right to marry. The second is the scope of that right.  
 I have suggested that like the right to vote, the right to marry is a right of equal 
access to a publicly-administered institution. If a state abolished the official institution of 
marriage, it would be acting constitutionally, so long as it did not also abolish private 
marriages ceremonies. The state is under no obligation to confer either the expressive or 
the material benefits of marriage. Some of the associational benefits now connected with 
marriage could, and probably must, be respected even if marriage did not exist. But this is 
not a claim that marriage itself must be recognized by state law. These points help to 
show that the right to marry is parasitic on positive law. It is a right of access, by those 
who enjoy it, to the expressive and material benefits that official marriage provides.  
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This point strongly suggests that the right to marry ought not to be protected as a 
matter of substantive due process. It is far more sensibly seen as part of the “fundamental 
rights” branch of equal protection doctrine. Unfortunately, there is no simple explanation 
of why it should so qualify. The most plausible account points to the expressive benefits 
of marriage. It suggests that in view of the great importance of those benefits, and their 
relationship to other constitutionally protected interests, states must provide extremely 
strong justifications for interfering with the right to marry. 
 I have also identified competing understandings of the scope of the right to marry. 
The minimal understanding understands the right to require access, by any couple 
consisting of one adult man and one adult woman, to the expressive and material benefits 
of marriage, so long as the institution of marriage exists. This minimal understanding has 
the advantage of fitting with the Court’s decisions; it also has a degree of simplicity, 
promises a deferential role for courts, and can claim to build on, rather than to reject, 
longstanding traditions. The minimal understanding does create problems for some bans 
on incestuous marriages; but where those bans cannot be plausibly defended by reference 
to actual harm, judicial invalidations are hardly deplorable.  
The chief advantage of the minimal understanding is that it promises to minimize 
judicial discretion and to rely on practices that, simply because they are time-honored, 
have a claim to social respect. The chief disadvantage of the minimal understanding is 
that it has a degree of arbitrariness. The best way to handle that arbitrariness, I suggest, is 
not through the due process clause, which grows out of traditional practices, but through 
the antidiscrimination principles of the equal protection clause, which is sharply critical 
of them. There can be no doubt that the due process clause, in its substantive guise, has 
come to have an equality component, one that tests the question whether the lines drawn 
by tradition can claim adequate support.108 But for constitutional purposes, any judgment 
about the right to marry involves an assessment of the legitimacy of those lines. There are 
significant advantages in acknowledging that the equal protection clause, a self-conscious 
attack on traditional practices, is the relevant text for making that assessment. I have 
suggested that in principle, there are serious constitutional problems with the ban on 
                                                 
108 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). For a defense of this view, see Note, Developments in 
the Law – The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv L Rev. 1156, 1177, 1186-92 (1980). 
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same-sex marriage. But I have also suggested that federal courts should hesitate in this 
domain, allowing a great deal of room for democratic judgment and for state 
experimentation. 
What about the marital institution itself? There are surprisingly plausible 
arguments for privatization—for eliminating the government’s role and for allowing 
private institutions, religious and otherwise, to do as they wish, subject to default rules 
and criminal prohibitions. Some of the longstanding arguments for official marriage have 
been weakened, now that exit is freely available, and now that private alternatives are 
legally permissible. In addition, the official institution does some harm, insofar as it 
makes certain distinctions that are not so easy to justify (as, for example, in the tax code), 
and insofar as it separates, too rigidly, relationships into the simple dichotomy of 
“married” and “unmarried.” I have not argued that the official institution of marriage 
should be abolished. Like most people, I believe that it should be continued, if only 
because it provides the basis for a kind of precommitment strategy that is often beneficial 
to adults and children alike. But an understanding of the arguments against official 
marriage clarifies a central fact: Marriage is unambiguously a form of government 
intervention, one whose future form should be a matter not of following dictates of any 
kind, but of our own free choices. 
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